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So You Think Deleting E-mail Is a
Good Idea?
Businesses in litigation might find they have the duty to preserve e-mail messages.
They also might find that deleting electronic messages relevant to legal proceedings
could result in sanctions. Several recent cases illustrate these complex issues that
have arisen as the popularity of electronic messages continues to explode.
The cases show that deleting e-mail is a bad idea.
by John S. Mrowiec
In the August 2003 issue of Midwest Construction, we wrote
about the obligation on a litigating party to locate "deleted"
electronic documents for production in litigation.
We summarized the principles announced by a federal court
in a dispute about discovery of electronic mail in the employment
discrimination case of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7939 (S.D.N.Y., May 13, 2003) ("Zubulake
II").
The lessons of Zubulake II were the following:
1. Electronic data is discoverable.
2."Deleted" electronic data, such as drafts and
electronic mails, most likely continue to reside somewhere.
3. The party responding to a document request or subpoena
might have to bear the cost of searching and retrieving all
"accessible" data, which will include the data on
hard drives, servers, optical disks and, depending on the
system, some back-up tapes.
4. The party responding to discovery might have to search
and retrieve some or all "inaccessible" data such
as on back-up tapes and fragmented or overwritten data especially
if the requesting party will bear the cost.
5. The party requesting documents might (but might not) have
to bear the cost of retrieving and searching that "inaccessible"
data.
The Zubulake parties' disputes about the preservation and
production of e-mails have continued.
In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) ("Zubulake IV"), the court held that a party
has a duty to preserve its electronic documents. That duty
attaches at the time litigation is reasonably anticipated,
not just after a complaint is filed:
"Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must
suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy
and put in place a 'litigation hold' to ensure the preservation
of relevant documents. As a general rule, that litigation
hold does not apply to inaccessible backup tapes (e.g., those
typically maintained solely for the purpose of disaster recovery),
which may continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth
in the company's policy. On the other hand, if backup tapes
are accessible (i.e., actively used for information retrieval),
then such tapes would likely be subject to the litigation
hold.
"[I]t does make sense to create one exception to this
general rule. If a company can identify where particular employee
documents are stored on backup tapes, then the tapes storing
the documents of 'key players' to the existing or threatened
litigation should be preserved if the information contained
on those tapes is not otherwise available. This exception
applies to all backup tapes" Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D.
at 218 (ordering sanctions against the employer for failing
to preserve electronic mail).
Another Opinion Issued
Now the Zubulake case has generated another court opinion,
this one on the consequences of not just failing to preserve
but actually deleting e-mails, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13574 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004) ("Zubulake
V").
Zubulake V imposed severe sanctions on the employer. The sanctions
might make it impossible to defend the case.
Zubulake V sets forth principles for lawyers and clients to
follow in the preservation, search and production of electronic
mail. Zubulake V also is illustrative regarding how it came
to light that e-mail had been deleted.
The facts in Zubulake V were the following:
(a) Immediately after the employee filed an EEOC charge in
August 2001, the employer's in-house counsel orally instructed
personnel not to destroy or delete hard copy or electronic
material potentially relevant to the employee's claims and
to segregate that material into separate files for later attorney
review. (The in-house counsel failed to consider segregating
"back-up tapes" that were maintained by the employer's
information technology personnel.)
(b) Shortly thereafter, outside counsel met with a number
of the key players in the litigation, reiterated the earlier
instructions and stressed the need to retain e-mail.
(c) Some six months later - and just after the employee had
filed her federal court complaint that followed the EEOC charge
- outside counsel repeated the earlier instructions, but this
time in writing. Another six months later, after receiving
the employee's formal document request seeking e-mails, outside
counsel again gave the written instruction to retain e-mails.
(d) Because the employee's document request specifically requested
e-mails on back-up tapes, outside counsel instructed the employer's
information technology personnel to stop recycling back-up
tapes. However, this instruction came some 18 months after
the court said the instruction should have been given.
(e) Every key employee spoke with outside counsel or received
his e-mails about the duty to preserve e-mails.
(f) After the court had ordered the employer to restore particular
back-up tapes, the parties discovered (i) some back-up tapes
were missing, and (ii) other back-up tapes contained e-mails
that were not present on the employer's "active"
files (but chronologically should have been).
(g) The review of the back-up tapes disclosed that at least
six key personnel had not retained certain e-mails germane
to the employee's claims. Once the back-up tapes were searched,
it became clear that the primary alleged discriminator had
deleted selected e-mails after counsel's instruction to maintain
all e-mail.
(h) More damaging, the recovered e-mails were found after
the primary alleged discriminator already had testified at
deposition and denied a critical fact. The e-mail recovered
from the back-up tape would easily contradict the denial.
(i) Another key employee deleted an old e-mail but forgot,
or failed to recognize, that he had forwarded it to another
employee months earlier. Thus, the deleted email appeared
on multiple back-up tapes.
(j) Many back-up tapes were lost or overwritten. As a result,
it was impossible to know how many e-mails were lost entirely.
(k) The parties also discovered more e-mails in the "active"
files that should have been produced but were not because
they were in individual employees' archived files on their
hard drives. This discovery was not made until after the employee
took thirteen depositions, and four ordered redepositions,
of the employer's key employees.
Points of Obligation
The Zubulake V court clarified that "[a] party's discovery
obligations do not end with the implementation of a 'litigation
hold' - to the contrary, that's only the beginning" Zubulake
V, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16574, *31. Zubulake V explained
the lawyer's responsibilities:
(1) Issue a "litigation hold" at the outset of litigation
or whenever litigation is reasonably anticipated. The hold
must be re-issued periodically to refresh all employees and
to advise new employees.
(2) Communicate directly with the "key players"
in the litigation about preserving evidence. Those people
should be periodically reminded.
(3) Instruct all employees to produce electronic copies of
their relevant active files.
(4) Ensure that all back-up media are retained to avoid recycling
over relevant material
Zubulake V, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13574, *32-41.
Despite the Zubulake V court's admonishment of the lawyers,
"[a]t the end of the day, however, the duty to preserve
and produce documents rests on the party" Zubulake V,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13574, *48. Because the employer "deleted
e-mails in defiance of explicit instructions not to,"
the Zubulake V court imposed significant sanctions, Zubulake
V, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13574, *49.
The most onerous of the Zubulake V sanctions was an adverse
inference instruction that would be given to the jury at the
trial:
"You have heard that [employer] failed to produce some
of the e-mails sent or received by [employer] personnel in
August and September 2001 . . . you are permitted, but not
required, to infer that the evidence would have been unfavorable
to [employer]" Zubulake V, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13574,
*61-62.
That type of instruction obviously makes it much more difficult
for the defending party to prevail. If the e-mails had not
been deleted, their contents might have been explained away.
Now, the defending party has lost the chance to explain.
A Look at Another Case
Zubulake V is not the only recent decision
to impose a severe sanction for deletion of e-mail. The case
of United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F.Supp.2d
21 (D.C., July 21, 2004), involves deleted e-mail in a case
alleging that the tobacco company intentionally marketed its
tobacco products to children.
The recent Philip Morris decision involves the government's
motion for evidentiary and monetary sanctions against the
company. The court had entered a standard Case Management
order requiring preservation of "all documents and other
records containing information which could be potentially
relevant to the subject matter of this litigation." The
company also had its own document retention policy to "print
and retain" e-mails.
Despite the order and policy, the company and its parents
deleted any e-mail over 60 days old on a monthly basis over
the next two years. The company continued to delete e-mails
even after it realized the deletions were impermissible and
did not notify the government or the court for four months
after discovering the problem.
"Particularly troubling" and "astounding"
to the Philip Morris court was that 11 employees, who "hold
some of the highest, most responsible positions in the company"
disobeyed the order and the company's document retention policy.
The court held that those 11 personnel would be precluded
from testifying at trial. That sanction certainly would make
the company's defense presentation difficult.
The Philip Morris court declined to impose the "adverse
inference" instruction requested by the government. That
requested instruction, unlike the instruction in Zubulake
V, sought the ultimate outcome desired by the government in
the case: that the company targeted its products to youth.
Instead, the Philip Morris court ordered a monetary sanction
to be paid by the company and its parent to the court registry
of $2,750,000. That sanction represented $250,000 for each
of the 11 employees who violated the "print and retain"
e-mail policy and the order.
Zubulake V and Philip Morris are not construction cases. However,
we can expect other federal courts to be influenced by the
decisions. Many state courts follow rules of civil litigation
procedure directly based on federal rules. Other states look
to federal decisions for guidance.
After the duty to preserve documents attaches, deleting e-mail
is a bad idea. As the cases show, deleting e-mail might cause
consequences far worse than producing the e-mail to the opponent.
John S. Mrowiec is a partner
with Chicago-based Conway & Mrowiec, a construction
and public contracts law and litigation practice. He may
be reached at (312) 658-1100. For information, go to the
firm's Web site at www.cmcontractors.com.
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